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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Hasan lcanovic appeals from the district court's order denying his petition for 
post-conviction relief following a remand from this Court. He asserts that the district 
court erred both in its determination that counsel did not provide deficient performance 
and that, even if he did, Mr. lcanovic suffered no prejudice. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Hasan lcanovic filed a timely petition seeking post-conviction relief from his guilty 
plea and sentencing for felony domestic violence. (R., pp.3-4.) In this petition, 
Mr. lcanovic alleged that he had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to 
his counsel's failure to advise him, prior to pleading guilty, that his plea would result in 
adverse immigration consequences that included deportation and loss of the ability to 
seek United States citizenship. (R., p.4.) He further alleged that his resulting plea was 
not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily as a result of his counsel's deficient 
performance. (R., p.4.) 
In his affidavit filed in support of this petition, Mr. lcanovic averred that, prior to 
the entry of his plea, he had asked his counsel specifically whether this plea would 
result in him being deported back to Bosnia and whether the conviction would preclude 
him from becoming a United States citizen. (R., pp.7-8.) According to Mr. lcanovic, his 
counsel said that neither consequence would result from his guilty plea to felony 
domestic violence. (R., pp.7-8.) However, Mr. lcanovic averred that he was served with 
an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainer once he was placed on 
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probation was currently being held on that detainer. (R., pp.7-8.) Finally, 
Mr. lcanovic averred that he would not have pleaded guilty to felony domestic violence 
had it not been for his counsel's erroneous advice. (R., pp.7-8.) 
Thereafter, the district court issued a notice of its intent to summarily dismiss this 
petition. (R., pp.15-21.) The court recognized that, accepting Mr. lcanovic's allegations 
as true, his trial counsel tendered constitutionally deficient performance in light of the 
recent U.S. Supreme Court Opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky1. (R., pp.18-19.) However, 
the district court found that Mr. lcanovic had not established the prejudice prong of his 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel i.e. that, but for this erroneous advice, he 
would not have pleaded guilty because the trial court advised him at the time of taking 
his plea that the plea might result in adverse immigration consequences. (R., pp.19-
20.) Therefore, in the district court's view, the deficiency of trial counsel was remedied 
by the court. (R., p.20.) 
Mr. lcanovic responded to the district court's notice of its intent to dismiss his 
post-conviction petition. (R., pp.27-33.) First, Mr. lcanovic noted that the immigration 
consequences resulting from his plea to felony domestic battery were clear - it is an 
aggravated felony, as well as a crime of domestic violence, that constitutes a deportable 
offense. (R., pp.29-31.) As such, under Padilla, his counsel had a duty not just to warn 
that there could be some form of adverse immigration consequences flowing from his 
plea; rather, his counsel had a duty to inform Mr. lcanovic what those specific 
consequences were. (R., pp.31-32.) In light of the duty to inform Mr. lcanovic regarding 
the specific immigration consequences of his plea, Mr. lcanovic argued that the district 
1 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
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court's advisory that there may be some form of adverse consequence did not cure 
counsel's deficiency. (R., p.32.) 
A hearing was held on Mr. lcanovic's petition for post-conviction relief. His 
former trial counsel, Jared Martens, testified at this hearing. (Tr., p.7, L.8 - p.23, L.5.)2 
Mr. Martens testified that he was aware that Mr. lcanovic was Bosnian at the time of his 
representation. (Tr., p.9, Ls.13-15.) He was also provided documentation during the 
discovery process, prior to Mr. lcanovic's guilty plea, that indicated that Mr. lcanovic 
was not a United States citizen. (Tr., p.10, L.21 - p.12, L.6.) Although Mr. Martens did 
not recall whether he paid attention to this fact during the course of representing 
Mr. lcanovic, he did acknowledge receiving and reviewing this documentation. 
(Tr., p.11, L.24 p.12, L.8.) 
Mr. Martens further acknowledged that Mr. lcanovic was concerned about the 
potential immigration consequences that could arise from his criminal charges so 
much so that they had talked about the matter more than once in discussing his criminal 
case. (Tr., p.12, Ls.9-14, p.15, L.24 - p.16, L.5.) Specifically, Mr. lcanovic was 
concerned that a guilty plea would result in the institution of removal proceedings 
against him. (Tr., p.12, Ls.15-24.) Mr. Martens merely told Mr. lcanovic that he didn't 
knowwhetherthatwould happen. (Tr., p.12, L.25-p.13, L.17.) However, Mr. Martens 
denied telling Mr. lcanovic that he specifically would not be deported based upon his 
plea to felony domestic battery. (Tr., p.14, Ls.12-19.) 
2 Citations to trial counsel's testimony are to the transcript filed in this Court prior to 
remand. Citations to the June 21, 2013 evidentiary hearing held after remand are to 
(6/21/13 Tr., p., Ls .. ) 
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Mr. Martens also admitted that he could not recall specifically whether he 
Mr. lcanovic that he would still be able to apply for U.S. citizenship even after his guilty 
plea, although he believed that he did not make that representation. (Tr., p.14, L.23 -
p.15, L.10.) In any case, Mr. Martens stated that he would have likely just referred 
Mr. lcanovic to an immigration attorney to answer that question, since he was not 
familiar with immigration law. (Tr., p.14, L.23 - p.15 L.10.) 
On cross-examination, Mr. Martens expressed his belief that the odds of a non-
citizen defendant facing deportation or removal proceedings based upon a guilty plea to 
felony domestic violence were not likely, but that it was, "probably a fifty-fifty shot," that 
this would occur. (Tr., p.20, L.20 - p.21, L.2.) Mr. Martens did believe that, at the time 
of the evidentiary hearing, such a result would be "highly probable." (Tr., p.21, L.17 -
p.22, L.1.) He did not share his personal assessment of the likelihood of this outcome 
with Mr. lcanovic as part of his representation during the underlying criminal 
proceedings; instead, Mr. Martens testified that he probably told Mr. lcanovic that he did 
not know what the immigration consequences would be. (Tr., p.21, Ls.3-13.) 
Mr. Martens was also unfamiliar with the U.S. Supreme Court Opinion in Padilla at the 
time of his testimony. (Tr., p.21, Ls.14-16.) 
During closing arguments, Mr. lcanovic pointed out to the district court that 
where, as in his case, the immigration consequences for a guilty plea are clear, it is not 
sufficient for counsel to merely tell a client that he or she does not know what the 
immigration consequences will be. (Tr., p.24, Ls.1-10.) Rather, counsel must 
specifically inform a non-citizen client what the consequences are and consult with the 
client with these consequences in mind during any plea negotiations. (Tr., p.25, L.14.) 
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Mr. lcanovic noted that, even if the district court found Mr. Martens more credible on the 
of whether affirmative misadvice as to immigration consequences was given, this 
did not matter for Padilla purposes, as affirmative and correct advice was required. 
(Tr., p.25, L.23 - p.26, L.16.) Mr. lcanovic also disputed that the plea colloquy from the 
court cured this error, as the court merely informed Mr. lcanovic that he might face 
adverse immigration consequences from his plea - not that he would face adverse 
immigration consequences - nor did the court inform Mr. lcanovic what those adverse 
consequences would be. (Tr., p.26, L.21 - p.27, L.15.) 
The district court ruled from the bench following closing arguments from the 
parties. First, the court found it "difficult" to believe that Mr. lcanovic was unaware of the 
immigration consequences of his plea when a judgment that was entered his 
plea contained an advisory that he faced an immigration hold. (Tr., p.31, L.14 p.32, 
L.10.) The court also noted that, at the time of the taking of his guilty plea, the district 
court informed Mr. lcanovic that his plea might result in adverse immigration 
consequences. (Tr., p.33, Ls.19-25.) 
Turning to the standards articulated in Padilla, the district court first found that 
Mr. Martens did not affirmatively tell Mr. lcanovic that there would be no adverse 
immigration consequences for his plea - i.e. that counsel did not provide misadvice to 
Mr. lcanovic. (Tr., p.35, Ls.16-18.) Regarding the failure of Mr. Martens to provide 
specific, accurate advice as to the immigration consequences of his plea, the district 
court held that this failure was "cured" by the district court's advisory to Mr. lcanovic 
during the change of plea hearing that there might be adverse immigration 
consequences for his plea. (Tr., p.35, L.19 - p.37, L.21.) 
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Following the hearing on Mr. lcanovic's post-conviction petition, the district court 
entered its order dismissing his petition based on the reasons set forth at that hearing. 
(R., p.48.) Mr. lcanovic appealed from the district court's order dismissing his petition 
for post-conviction relief. (R., p.44.) He asserted that he had demonstrated both 
deficient performance and prejudice and that the district court erred by denying his 
petition. (See generally, Appellant's Brief.) The State responded, asserting that Padilla 
did not apply to Mr. lcanovic's case. (See generally, Respondent's Brief.) 
At oral argument, the State conceded error and the parties entered into an 
agreement to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing. ( See Uncontested Motion for 
Remand and Statement in Support Thereof, filed on December 7, 2012 (hereinafter, 
Motion for Remand.)) The State acknowledged that its position regarding the 
application of Padilla was in error. (Motion for Remand, p.2.) 
In the motion for remand, the State conceded that "the district court's summary 
dismissal on the basis that instructing lcanovic of potential immigration consequences 
cured any prejudice that might arise from incorrect immigration advice of counsel was 
error." (Motion for Remand, p.2) The State conceded that, "there is an issue of fact on 
the prejudice prong of his claim." (Motion for Remand, p.2) Then, the State conceded 
that, "federal immigration law applicable to lcanovic provides that he is deportable." 
(Motion for Remand, p.2 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i)). Finally, the State 
conceded that, "there was still a disparity between correct legal advice (that deportation 
was generally mandatory) and the advice given to lcanovic (that there were potential 
immigration problems.)" (Motion for Remand, p.2.) 
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On remand, the parties briefed the issue and the district court subsequently held 
a hearing. At the hearing, Mr. lcanovic testified that he was currently on parole and that 
he was subject to an immigration hold. (6/21/13 Tr., p.49, s.11 - p.51, L.5.) He had 
been informed that federal authorities were actively seeking his deportation. (6/21/13 
Tr., p.52, Ls.17-19.) Mr. lcanovic testified that the only reason he had not yet been 
deported was that there was confusion regarding his place of birth and neither Croatia 
nor Bosnia was prepared to accept him. (6/21/13 Tr., p.53, Ls.3-14.) 
Brandon Jones, a supervisory detention deportation officer for Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) testified for the State. (6/21/13 Tr., p.60, Ls.6-10.) Officer 
Jones testified generally to immigration and deportation procedures and stated the 
following, which is of importance in this case: 
Q. (The Prosecutor): So if an individual alien were to get the advice 
that a conviction of an aggravated felony might or might not cause them 
to be deported, would that be accurate advice? 
A. (Mr. Jones): Can you repeat that? 
Q. If a person as an alien was given advice that a conviction for an 
aggravated felony might or might not result in their actual deportation, 
would that be accurate advice? 
A. That would be accurate, yes, ma'am. 
(6/21/13 Tr., p.97, Ls.10-20.) 
The district court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. The 
court found Mr. Martens more credible than Mr. lcanovic: "specifically, this Court finds 
that Mr. Martens did in fact advise Mr. lcanovic that if he chose to plead guilty, it was 
possible he could be deported and that there could be adverse impacts on his ability to 
obtain United States citizenship." (Order re: evidentiary hearing, p.27.) Then, despite 
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the concession in this Court that the district court's warnings were inadequate, 
the district court found that, "this Court advised Mr. lcanovic that a felony or even a 
misdemeanor conviction could result in his deportation, inability to obtain legal status or 
denial of an application for United States citizenship." (Order re: evidentiary hearing, 
p.27.) 
The court then found that the testimony of Officer Jones supported its conclusion 
that the advice given by Mr. Martens and the district court was accurate because of the 
above-referenced exchange: 
Q. (The Prosecutor): So if an individual alien were to get the advice 
that a conviction of an aggravated felony might or might not cause them 
to be deported, would that be accurate advice? 
A. (Mr. Jones): Can you repeat that? 
Q. If a person as an alien was given advice that a conviction for an 
aggravated felony might or might not result in their actual deportation, 
would that be accurate advice? 
A. That would be accurate, yes, ma'am. 
(Order re: evidentiary hearing, p.28.) Thus, the court concluded that, "Mr. lcanovic was 
fully aware at the time he entered his plea of the possible deportation and citizenship 
consequences of his plea." (Order re: evidentiary hearing, p.28 (emphasis added.)) 
The district court then addressed the prejudice prong of the analysis. First, it 
noted that Mr. lcanovic pleaded guilty to a lesser charge than that with which he was 
initially charged, and stated that, in light of the admissions Mr. lcanovic made at the 
entry of plea hearing, a conviction would be a "near certainty." 
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Then, the district court stated, "it is not even necessary to rely on such evidence" 
because the evidence of Mr. lcanovic's guilt was overwhelming. The court summarized 
this "evidence" as follows: 
This was not a "he said, she said" case of domestic violence. Not only did 
the victim describe the basic facts of the crime to the police and provide a 
written statement, but an uninvolved third-party witness, Ms. Lynn Majors, 
told officers she had witnessed Mr. lcanovic hit the victim (Sanela 
Medmedovic) on the face and neck, that she yelled at Mr. lcanovic to stop, 
and that she called the police, at which point Mr. lcanovic left the scene. 
There was also bruising and swelling on the victim's neck observed by the 
police' thus, physical evidence existed to confirm the attack and, in 
addition, the petitioner himself admitted to the attack. 
(Order re: evidentiary hearing, pp.31-32.) This "evidence," as acknowledged by the 
district court, comes from the State's district court brief, which the court determined, "to 
be accurate statements as to the pertinent to the facts cited." (Order re: evidentiary 
hearing, p.32 n.5.) The court, therefore, determined that it was not required to accept 
Mr. lcanovic's assertion that he would not have pleaded guilty but for counsel's 
misadvice because the evidence was so overwhelming, it was not reasonable to 
conclude that he would have insisted on proceeding to trial. (Order re: evidentiary 
hearing, p.33.) 
This Court reactivated the appeal following the district court's order. Because the 
district court is incorrect with regard to both deficient performance and prejudice prongs, 




Did the district court err when it denied Mr. lcanovic's petition for post-conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. lcanovic's Petition For Post-Conviction 
Relief 
A. Introduction 
The district court erred when it dismissed Mr. lcanovic's petition for post-
conviction relief because Mr. lcanovic demonstrated by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel prior to the entry of his guilty 
plea to felony domestic violence. There is no dispute that Mr. lcanovic, a non-citizen, 
was not informed by his trial counsel prior to entering his plea that his plea would render 
him automatically and presumptively deportable under clear immigration law. Because 
the immigration consequences of his plea were clear under federal law, Mr. lcanovic 
was entitled to affirmative and correct advice as to the immigration consequences of this 
plea. Further, because the district court's prejudice analysis is based upon evidence 
that would either be inadmissible at trial or was not introduced at the evidentiary 
hearing, the district court erred by holding that Mr. lcanovic suffered no prejudice. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A petition seeking post-conviction relief initiates a separate civil proceeding 
distinct from the original criminal actions. See, e.g., Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231, 
233 (Ct. App. 1994 ). "In a post-conviction proceeding, the burden is on the applicant to 
establish the grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. 
Upon review of a district court's denial of a petition for post-conviction relief when 
an evidentiary hearing has occurred, Idaho appellate courts will not disturb the district 
court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 
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695, 700 (1999); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67 (Ct. App.1990). When reviewing 
mixed questions of law and fact, the appellate court defers to the district court's factual 
findings supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of the 
relevant law to those facts. Id. (citing Young v. State, 115 Idaho 52, 54 (Ct. App.1988)). 
"A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the 
post-conviction procedure act." Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272 (Ct. App. 2002). 
A petitioner's allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel within a post-conviction 
petition is measured by the standards articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Strickland v. Washington3 . See, e.g., State v. Yokovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (2007). 
The standard involves a two-party inquiry: first, whether the defendant has 
demonstrated that his counsel tendered deficient performance, meaning that counsel's 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and second, whether 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the 
proceedings would have been different. Id. In the context of alleged deficiencies of 
counsel relating to guilty pleas, the specific standard for prejudice is whether, "there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty 
and would have insisted on going to trial." Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676 (2009). 
3 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. lcanovic's Petition For Post-
Conviction Relief 
1. Under Padilla v. Kentucky, Defense Counsel Owes A Duty, Pursuant To 
The Sixth Amendment Of The United States Constitution, To A Non-
Citizen Defendant To Inform His Or Her Client Regarding Potential 
Deportation Consequences Of A Guilty Plea 
Prior to the recent U.S. Supreme Court Opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky 559 U.S. 
356 (2010), there was a dearth of case law in Idaho dealing with what obligations, if 
any, defense counsel had towards a non-citizen client with regard to immigration 
consequences flowing from a guilty plea to a criminal offense. The leading case was 
Retamoza v. State, in which the Idaho Court of Appeals determined that there was no 
deficient performance where defense counsel failed to advise a non-citizen criminal 
defendant of the then-existing option of a judicial recommendation against deportation 
(JRAD). Retamoza v. State, 125 Idaho 792, 795-797 (Ct. App. 1994). The Retamoza 
Court so held based explicitly on parsing out the distinction between direct and 
collateral consequences of a guilty plea, and the concomitant conclusion that 
immigration consequences were collateral to such a plea. Id. 
The Retamoza Court's conclusion is somewhat understandable given the state of 
the immigration law at the time of the defendant's plea in that case. At the time of the 
guilty plea of the defendant in Retamoza in 1988, there existed two very important 
mechanisms through which adverse immigration consequences flowing from a criminal 
conviction could be avoided. See Retamoza, 125 Idaho at 793. First, a non-citizen who 
was eligible for deportation because of a criminal conviction could seek a judicial 
recommendation against deportation, or JRAD. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 
362 (2010). Under this provision, the sentencing judge for either a state or federal 
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prosecution had the to enter a recommendation against deportation, and this 
recommendation had the effect of precluding the executive branch from seeking 
deportation. Id. Therefore, at the time of the Retamoza Opinion, there was no such 
thing as an "automatically deportable offense." 
There was an additional second layer of process through which a non-citizen 
criminal defendant could avoid adverse immigration consequences, such as 
deportation, as a result of his or her plea at the time Retamoza was decided. Prior to 
1996, the Attorney General retained discretion to grant relief from deportation. Id. at 
363-64. As such, the Retamoza Opinion dealt with an attorney's advisories about 
immigration consequences to a guilty plea at a time when these consequences were 
truly avoidable in virtually all cases. 
But the landscape of immigration law changed drastically in the intervening 
years, and these changes motivated the Padilla Court to make clear what a criminal 
defense attorney's obligations are with regard to advising non-citizen clients as to 
immigration consequences of a plea. Since the time of the guilty plea at issue in 
Retamoza, the authority of a trial court to grant a JRAD has been eliminated entirely; as 
has the Attorney General's authority to grant discretionary relief against deportation. Id. 
As noted by the Padilla Court: 
The landscape of federal immigration law has changed dramatically over 
the last 90 years. While once there was only a narrow class of deportable 
offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to prevent 
deportation, immigration reforms over time have expanded the class of 
deportable offenses and limited the authority of judges to alleviate the 
harsh consequence of deportation. The "drastic measure" of deportation 
or removal is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens 
convicted of crimes. 
Id. at 360 (internal citations omitted). The Court continued: 
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These changes to our immigration law have dramatically raised the stakes 
of a noncitizen's criminal conviction. The importance of accurate legal 
advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more important. 
These changes confirm our view that, as a matter of federal law, 
deportation is an integral part indeed, sometimes the most important 
part - of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who 
plead guilty to specified crimes. 
Id. at 364. 
In light of the modern interconnectedness between criminal guilty pleas and 
presumptively mandatory adverse immigration consequences, the Padilla Court 
developed a two-tiered test for what advisories are required under the Sixth Amendment 
with regard to the potential immigration consequences of a plea. Where the immigration 
consequences of a particular plea are "unclear or uncertain," trial counsel has a duty to 
inform a non-citizen defendant that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of 
adverse immigration consequences. Id. at 368-69. But when the deportation 
consequences of a particular plea are clear, trial counsel has a duty to give his or her 
non-citizen client affirmative and correct advice regarding the specific immigration 
consequences of that plea. Id. 
The Padilla Court, in formulating this test, explicitly rejected the idea that the 
measure of counsel's responsibility in informing clients regarding the consequence of a 
guilty plea is measured by whether the consequence would be classified as direct or 
collateral. The Court noted that it has, "never applied a distinction between direct and 
collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally 'reasonable professional 
assistance' under Strickland." Id. at 365. And the Court further asserted that such a 
distinction is particularly inapplicable in the context of immigration consequences for 
criminal convictions. Id. at 366. 
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2. Trial Counsel Tendered Deficient Performance When Trial Counsel Failed 
To Advise Mr. lcanovic As To The Specific Potential Immigration 
Consequences Of His Plea To Felony Domestic Battery 
a. The Deportation Consequences For Mr. lcanovic's Guilty Plea To 
Felony Domestic Battery Were Clear Under The Federal Law 
Preliminarily, prior to remand there appears to have been some confusion on the 
part of the State as to what the Padilla Court meant when it discussed those cases 
where the immigration consequences of a plea were clear under the federal law. The 
State repeatedly referenced, and argued, the issue of whether and when Mr. lcanovic 
would eventually be actually, physically removed as though this were the standard by 
which counsel's duty was measured. (Tr., p.13, L.5 - p.1 L.10, p.22, L.9 p.23, L.2, 
p.28, L.13 p.29, L.20.) The State's misunderstanding of the actual standard for when 
definitive advice as to the potential immigration consequences of a plea is required, can 
be encapsulated in the following statement: 
And I think that's because immigration law is not clear. It is not a black 
and white matter where you know for sure that if someone is going to be 
convicted of a crime like this that they are going to be deported. Rather, 
they are going to be subject to it and they may or may not be 
deported which is the category that Mr. lcanovic falls into. 
(Tr., p.29, Ls. 13-20) (emphasis added.) 
To be clear, this is not the standard by which counsel's duty to give concrete, 
accurate, affirmative advice as to the specific immigration consequences is judged. The 
test is whether the federal statutory law makes it clear that the particular offense will 
render a non-citizen client eligible for deportation or subject to automatic 
deportation - not whether, in the best guess of defense counsel, immigration and 
customs enforcement will ever get around to initiating removal proceedings. See 
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360-61; 368-69. And this standard is measured by whether, under 
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the pertinent immigration statutes, regulations, and case law, the consequence of the 
defendant's guilty plea on his or her immigration status is clearly defined. Id. at 369 
(finding that, "The consequences of Padilla's plea 
the removal statute"). 
The State acknowledged this in the Motion for Remand. (See Motion for 
Remand, p.2.) Specifically, the State conceded that, "federal immigration law applicable 
to lcanovic provides that he is deportable." (Motion for Remand, p.2 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(E)(i)). Then, the State conceded that, "there was still a disparity between 
correct legal advice (that deportation was generally mandatory) and the advice given to 
lcanovic (that there were potential immigration problems.)" (Motion for Remand, p.2.) 
Unfortunately, despite the guidance provided by the Motion for Remand, the 
prosecutor and the district court engaged in the same mistake as before. The court 
stated: "specifically, this Court finds that Mr. Martens did in fact advise Mr. lcanovic that 
if he chose to plead guilty, it was possible he could be deported and that there could be 
adverse impacts on his ability to obtain United States citizenship." (Order re: 
evidentiary hearing, p.27.) Then, despite the State's concession in this Court that the 
district court's warnings were inadequate, the district court found that, "this Court 
advised Mr. lcanovic that a felony or even a misdemeanor conviction could result in his 
deportation, inability to obtain legal status or denial of an application for United States 
citizenship." (Order re: evidentiary hearing, p.27.) 
The court concluded that, "Mr. lcanovic was fully aware at the time he entered his 
plea of the possible deportation and citizenship consequences of his plea." (Order re: 
evidentiary hearing, p.28.) Then, again despite the State's concession that the district 
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court's warnings to Mr. lcanovic were inadequate, the district court questioned 
Mr. lcanovic's intentions with regard to this petition, faulting him for advancing the 
"legally baseless argument" that trial courts cannot rectify defense counsel's failure to 
provide inadequate advice. (Order re: evidentiary hearing, p.28.) This is simply not the 
correct standard. 
As is set forth below, under the applicable immigration statutes and regulations, 
the immigration consequences of Mr. lcanovic's plea were entirely clear. His plea to 
felony domestic battery rendered him subject to automatic deportation in light of two 
provisions - both as an aggravated felony, as this was a "crime of violence" under 
federal law, and as a crime of domestic violence. 
i. Mr. lcanovic's Guilty Plea To Felony Domestic Violence In 
This Case Constituted An Admission To An Aggravated 
Felony Under Immigration Law Because His Offense 
Qualified As A Crime Of Violence 
Mr. lcanovic pleaded guilty to felony domestic violence under I.C. §§ 18-903, 18-
918(2). The Amended Information as to this charge alleged that the crime was 
committed as follows: 
That the Defendant, HASAN ICANOVIC, on or about the 11 th day of May, 
2009, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did willfully and unlawfully use 
force and/or violence upon the person of Sanela Mehmedovic by pushing 
Sanela Mehmedovic to the ground and by committing said battery, did 
inflict a traumatic injury to the person of Sanela Mehmedovic, to-wit: a 
bruised lip, and where Sanela Mehmedovic and the Defendant are 
household members. 
(R., p.29.) 
In Idaho, the offense of felony domestic violence, as charged in this case, is 
defined as a battery against a household member that inflicts traumatic injury. See 
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I. § 18-918(2). Under the manner in which Mr. lcanovic was charged in this case, he 
was alleged to have committed this battery through, "willfully and unlawfully [using] force 
or violence." I.C. § 18-903(1 ); R., p.29. By the terms of this plea agreement, 
Mr. lcanovic pleaded guilty to an offense that constitutes an aggravated felony, as a 
crime of violence, under the pertinent immigration statutes. 
A non-citizen who commits an aggravated felony is presumptively deportable. 
See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). An offense constitutes an aggravated felony if, inter 
a/ia, the offense constitutes "a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18, but 
not including a purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment is at least 
one year." 8 U .C. § 1101 (a)(43)(F). In turn, a "crime of violence," for purposes of 
immigration law, is defined as follows: 
The term "crime of violence" means-
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, 
or threatened use of physical force against the person or 
property of another, or 
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, 
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or 
property of another may be used in the course of committing the 
offense. 
18 U.S.C. § 16 (emphasis added). 
One of the elements of felony domestic violence, as charged in the State's 
Amended Information in this case, was that Mr. lcanovic willfully and unlawful used 
force or violence on the person of another. Given this, Mr. lcanovic's plea of guilty to 
felony domestic violence in this case meets with the definition of a crime of violence, 
and therefore constitutes an aggravated felony that rendered him eligible for 
deportation. 
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The immigration consequences of Mr. lcanovic's plea of guilty to felony domestic 
violence were clear under federal law this offense falls squarely within the statutory 
definition of an aggravated felony as a crime of violence for which there is a 
presumption of deportability. 
ii. Mr. lcanovic's Guilty Plea To Felony Domestic Violence In 
This Case Constituted An Admission To A Crime Of 
Domestic Violence 
In addition, the immigration consequences of Mr. lcanovic's plea were clear, as 
he was eligible for deportation under the plea as an admission to a crime of domestic 
violence. Under federal law, a non-citizen is eligible for deportation if he or she commits 
a crime of domestic violence. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). A "crime of domestic 
violence" for immigration purposes means a crime of violence that is directed against a 
person who shares one certain enumerated relationships with the defendant, or who is 
otherwise "protected from that individual's acts under the domestic or family violence 
laws of the United States or any State, Indian tribal government, or unit of local 
government." Id. 
Mr. lcanovic pleaded guilty to felony domestic violence, which inherently involves 
the allegation of a crime of violence against a "household member." See I.C. §§ 18-
903, 18-918. This offense establishes certain classes of persons who are protected 
from the charged individual's acts under the domestic violence statute. Therefore, 
Mr. lcanovic's plea to this offense falls clearly within the scope of a crime of domestic 
violence under federal immigration law. By statute, the consequence of his conviction 
was clear - as a crime of domestic violence under immigration law, it rendered him 
eligible for deportation. 
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b. Because The Immigration Consequences For Mr. lcanovic's Plea 
Were Clear Under The Federal Law, His Trial Counsel Had A Duty 
To Advise Mr. lcanovic Of The Specific Consequences Of This 
Plea, And It Constituted Deficient Performance When Counsel 
Failed To Do So 
Where the immigration consequences of a guilty plea are clear under federal law, 
trial counsel has a duty to affirmatively inform a non-citizen defendant as to the specific 
immigration consequences of that plea. As has been noted, the immigration 
consequences of Mr. lcanovic's plea were clear - his plea rendered him eligible for 
deportation - and further subject to a conclusive presumption of deportability. 
Upon remand, the district court heard no additional testimony from Mr. Martens. 
Thus, there is no dispute in this case that Mr. Martens did not advise Mr. lcanovic that 
his plea rendered him eligible for deportation - and further subject to a conclusive 
presumption of deportability, despite multiple conversations during which Mr. lcanovic 
asked him about the immigration consequences of his plea. (Tr., p.14, L.12 - p.16, L.5, 
p.20, Ls.11-13, p.21, L.8 - p.22, L.1.) Because Mr. lcanovic was entitled to be informed 
by counsel of the specific immigration consequences of his guilty plea to felony 
domestic violence, and because there is no dispute in this case that his counsel did not 
provide this information, Mr. lcanovic's trial counsel tendered deficient performance. 
The district court's focus on the possible consequences (that deportation was 
possible but not certain) is in error. The State has already conceded that advice of 
"potential" consequences is inadequate. (Motion for Remand, p.2.) Of course 
Mr. Martens could not have told Mr. lcanovic whether the federal government would 
actually decide to begin deportation proceedings - he is not a federal immigration 
officer. The correct legal advice was that Mr. lcanovic was presumptively deportable; 
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the State acknowledges that, "deportation was 
Remand, p.2.) There is no evidence in the record 
mandatory." (Motion for 
Mr. lcanovic was informed that 
he was presumptively deportable or that deportation was mandatory. Advice that he 
"could" face deportation is not adequate. The district court erred by holding that 
Mr. Martens' advice, and the court's warnings, were accurate statements of the 
immigration consequences. 
3. Mr. lcanovic Was Prejudiced As A Result Of Trial Counsel's Deficient 
Performance 
Mr. lcanovic also demonstrated prejudice from his trial counsel's failure to advise 
him regarding the immigration consequences of his guilty plea to felony domestic 
violence. As has been noted, the test for prejudice in such a case is whether there is a 
reasonable probability that, had the defendant received adequate advice, he would not 
have pleaded guilty to the charged offense. Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 676. 
The potential immigration consequences for a guilty plea cannot be overstated. 
In fact, the Padilla Court noted the severity of deportation as an immigration 
consequence in noting that it is the modern equivalent of banishment or exile. Padilla, 
559 U.S. at 373-74. Under the modern landscape of immigration law, the Padilla Court 
further noted that deportation is often the most important aspect of the penalties that 
may be imposed on non-citizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes. Id. at 
364. 
In determining that Mr. lcanovic had failed to establish prejudice, the district court 
first noted that that Mr. lcanovic pleaded guilty to a lesser charge than that with which 
he was initially charged, and stated that, in light of the admissions Mr. lcanovic made at 
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the entry of plea hearing, a conviction would be a "near certainty." (Order re: 
evidentiary hearing, p.31.) lcanovic notes that the remedy he is seeking is 
withdrawal of his plea. If he were to go to trial, it would be after his plea is withdrawn. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 410 applies and is specific: 
(a) Inadmissibility. Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of 
the following is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible 
against the defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the 
plea discussions: 
(1) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn; 
[ ... ] 
(3) any statement made in the course of any proceedings under Rule 
11 of the Idaho Rules of Criminal Procedure or comparable Federal 
or state procedure regarding either of the foregoing pleas. 
IRE 41 0(a). Thus, Mr. lcanovic's plea and the statements made during the plea hearing 
are not admissible in any future trial.4 Further, Mr. lcanovic was asserting that, due to 
the ineffective assistance of counsel, his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary. Admissions made by a defendant that are not knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary are not admissible. See, e.g., State v. Valero, 153 Idaho 910 (Ct. App. 2012). 
Then, the district court stated, "it is not even necessary to rely on such evidence" 
because the evidence of Mr. lcanovic's guilt was overwhelming. (Order re: evidentiary 
hearing, p.31.) The court summarized this "evidence" as follows: 
This was not a "he said, she said" case of domestic violence. Not only did 
the victim describe the basic facts of the crime to the police and provide a 
written statement, but an uninvolved third-party witness, Ms. Lynn Majors, 
4 The Rule provides for exceptions where another statement made in the course of 
discussions has already been introduced and the statement should be in fairness 
contemporaneously with it, where the trial is for perjury or false statement if the 
statement was made under oath and with presence of counsel, or for impeachment. 
IRE 410(b). None of these exceptions apply at this time. 
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told officers she had witnessed Mr. lcanovic hit the victim (Sanela 
Medmedovic) on the face and neck, that she yelled at Mr. lcanovic to stop, 
and that she called the police, at which point Mr. lcanovic left the scene. 
There was also bruising and swelling on the victim's neck observed by the 
police thus, physical evidence existed to confirm the attack and, in 
addition, the petitioner himself admitted to the attack. 
(Order re: evidentiary hearing, pp.31-32.) This "evidence," as acknowledged by the 
district court, comes from the State's brief in the district court, which the court 
determined, "to be accurate statements as to the pertinent facts cited." (Order re: 
evidentiary hearing, p.32 n.5.)5 However, statements made by parties in a brief are not 
evidence. The State has acknowledged this before in a case involving a motion to 
suppress where the district court relied upon the representation in a brief as opposed to 
evidence offered at the suppression hearing: 
Babb challenges the district court's findings because the court relied on 
facts asserted in the State's supplemental briefing that were unsupported 
by the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. On appeal, the 
State concedes that the district court improperly adopted the State's 
assertions as factual findings without an evidentiary basis. 
State v. Babb, 136 Idaho 95, 97 (Ct. App. 2001 ). Idaho courts often state that the 
findings of fact of the trier of fact will not be disturbed on appeal if they are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. See, e.g., State v. Tierny, 109 Idaho 474, 476 
(1985). The rationale for this rule is that it "reflects the view that deference must be 
accorded to the trial judge's special opportunity to assess and weigh the credibility of 
the witnesses who appear." Id. However, where, as in the present case, the trier of fact 
5 Some of the facts relied upon by the district court, such as the witness's name, are not 
contained in the State's briefing. While it is unknown where these facts may come from, 
they certainly do not come from the evidentiary hearing and thus cannot be relied upon 
by the court. 
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never seen a witness testify about the alleged facts or even seen an affidavit from 
that witness, the trier of fact cannot reasonably determine credibility. 
It is undisputed that Mr. lcanovic was very concerned about the potential 
immigration consequences of his plea prior to pleading guilty. He averred within his 
petition for post-conviction relief that, but for counsel's inadequate advice regarding the 
immigration consequences of his plea, he would not have pleaded guilty to felony 
domestic violence. (R., p.8.) He submitted an affidavit into evidence at the second 
evidentiary hearing that also averred that he would not have pleaded guilty but for 
counsel's advice. (Defendant's Exhibit A.) It is also undisputed that Mr. lcanovic 
repeatedly asked his trial attorney for counsel and advice as to the immigration 
consequences of his plea. (Tr., p.14, 1.12 - p.1 L.5.) Under the record in this case, it 
is clear that the immigration consequences of his plea were of central importance to 
Mr. lcanovic in weighing whether to plead guilty in this case. These allegations are not 
rebutted by any evidence in the record. In light of this, Mr. lcanovic demonstrated a 
reasonable probability that, but for the absence of affirmative, correct advice as to the 
consequences of his guilty plea, he would not have pleaded guilty to felony domestic 
violence. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. lcanovic respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
denying his petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 21 st day of May, 2014. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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